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ABSTRACT 
 
Singapore’s regionalization program is centred on a number of industrial township developments in China, India 
and several Southeast Asian countries. These townships are led by Singapore government-linked companies, and 
are premised on the perception that Singapore’s positive reputation with multinational corporations, for efficient 
industrial infrastructure and stable, corrupt-free administration, will give the townships a marketing advantage. 
Singapore’s first transborder industrialization project in Batam (Indonesia) reflects this stratagem. This paper1 
follows from earlier papers on the limits of cloning Singapore’s industrial development model beyond demarcated 
geographical boundaries. The strategy was refined in Singapore’s foray into Bangalore, India. This paper 
concludes that, in contrast to the earlier ‘failed’ experiments in Vietnam and China, the project in India, the 
International Technology Park Limited (ITPL), has achieved some measure of success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore’s regionalization strategy comprised state-led infrastructure projects, and a range of incentives and 
regulatory innovations designed to assist private companies and individuals to move overseas2 [2]. The program 
involved the establishment of industrial townships to create a ‘Singapore-styled’ business environment for local and 
Singapore-based MNCs to expand regionally. The Singapore government, in this instance, takes the initiative to 
develop regional sites as locations to access resources and markets.  
 
The paper takes up the discussion on Singapore’s lesser-known industrial-township project in India. The discussion 
commences with further background to the regionalization program, followed by an account of the origins and 
progress of the case study park. This flagship project is then evaluated in terms of the progress in attracting 
investment, the contributions to the strategic objectives associated with the park, as well as to Singapore’s broader 
regionalization initiative. The final part of the paper considers the implications of these experiences for Singapore’s 
regionalization program, as well as the city-state’s ability to export its efficiency in industrial park development and 
management outside its borders. 
 
SINGAPORE’S REGIONALIZATION STORY 
 
The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of the Singapore government’s aggressive approach to woo foreign MNCs to 
fuel the city-state’s economic development [16] [26]. By the early 1980s, rising business costs rendered it an 
imperative for Singapore to shift from labor-intensive activities towards higher value-added ones [12]. Singapore’s 
economic planners sought to expand the island's investment horizons through an overseas direct investment program 
launched in 1988. The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global 
Economy. The 1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations. This initiative sought 
to accelerate access to new technology, or foreign markets, by supporting Singapore companies to form joint 
ventures with overseas companies in Europe and North America. Most of these investments proved unsuccessful, 
resulting in enormous losses by the early 1990s [21]. A new phase in the internationalization strategy re-focused on 
expansion within Asia. The change from internationalization (or, in local parlance, outer globalization) to 
regionalization (inner globalization) was rationalized by the liberalization of foreign investment controls occurring 
at the time in countries like Indonesia, China and Vietnam, and the high growth rates these economies were 
achieving [10] [15] [17] [27]. The strategic repositioning was discussed at the 1993 Regionalization Forum, and 
encapsulated in the policy document, Singapore Unlimited. This point was amplified by the Committee to Promote 
Enterprise Overseas [25]: 
 
“… Other countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have invested 
overseas in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and China in a big way in 
the last 4-5 years. These investments will give their GNP an added boost. 
Mature economies like those of the US, Japan, France and Switzerland have this 
external dimension which broadens their domestic operations and help upgrade 
their economy. For the same reasons, we must grow an external wing to our 
economy.” 
 
Private sector reluctance3 in regionalizing was the Government’s raison d’être that Singapore’s government linked 
companies (GLCs) should lead the regionalization drive. The Government’s role in the township developments was 
three-pronged. First, senior politicians and civil servants negotiated4 the institutional framework for the project, 
which typically involved garnering special investment conditions in the host location. Second, Singapore 
government agencies and GLCs were the prime investors in the infrastructure and real estate development, usually 
via a ‘government-selected’ consortium. The prominence of government agencies and government-linked 
companies reflected the scale and long pay-back periods for infrastructure, which may make the investment 
unattractive to private companies alone. The third role played by the state was in the marketing and promotion of the 
parks. 
 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARK LIMITED (ITPL) 
 
The industrial-township projects in Indonesia, China and Vietnam had a political objective to demonstrate the 
strength of the ‘Singapore development model’ and its transferability to other Asian environments. ITPL has 
narrower objectives, based on the perception that Singapore agencies have an advantage in infrastructural 
development in India. ITPL was instigated as a real estate development.  
 
ITPL, located 18km away from Bangalore in India’s Silicon Valley, was launched in 1994, as a forerunner for a new 
generation of Singapore-developed industrial parks in India. The idea was mooted by Singapore’s Prime Minister 
Goh Chok Tong and India’s then Premier, P.V. Narasimha Rao, in 1992. Construction commenced in September 
1994, and the park was officially inaugurated in 2000.The partners in the ITPL project are a Singapore consortium5 
of companies led by Ascendas International, the Tata Group (India’s largest business conglomerate) and the 
Karnataka state government in a 40-40-20 arrangement. The Karnataka state government has since reduced its stake 
to 6 percent, while the Singapore consortium and the Tata Group have increased their respective stakes to 47 percent 
each. 
ITPL was marketed as an environment that “cuts through the red tape and bottlenecks that are a part of India’s 
infrastructure and operating environment” (The Straits Times, August 8, 1999). ITPL was slated to provide total 
business space solutions to multinationals and other conglomerates, within a state-of-the-art technology park. The 
park’s development consists of 2 phases. Phase 1, which includes the Discoverer, Creator and Innovator blocks, with 
built-up office, production and retail space, adopts the Singapore-styled, integrated ‘work, live and play’ concept. 
Phase 2, comprising the Explorer building, a replica of the Innovator, and Built-To-Suit (BTS) facilities, is due for 
completion in early 2004. This phase will add a total area of 350,000 square feet to ITPL’s current built-up area of 
1.6 million square feet. ITPL also houses the Indian Institute of Information Technology, which provides 
professional and skilled manpower for the park’s tenants. ITPL’s first development phase is fully committed. The 
earliest clients included SAP Labs, First Ring and 24/7. The first 39 tenants started their operations in 1999, and 
created some 2000 jobs. To date, there are 100 confirmed tenants, of which 93 are operational with 8500 employees  
More than half the tenants are wholly or partially foreign-owned firms, and more than 70 percent are in software 
development, integrated circuit design, research and development and precision technology. ITPL’s tenants include 
global players like AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Sony, Texas Instruments, Citicorp and Thomas Cook. Operating profits 
have been registered, and ITPL is projected to break even within the next 4 years.     
ITPL’s competitive advantages as an investment location have been discussed. However, the update has relied 
primarily on secondary data from official publications, press reports, etc. This stock-take cannot adequately reflect 
the differential impact of various pull factors on the investment decision of different types of investors (e.g. local or 
foreign), or the differential impact of different types of constraints on the operations of firms with different 
characteristics (e.g. ownership type, market orientation, establishment size). To obtain firm-level data, on-site 
surveys and interviews were conducted in December 2002 and May 2003. The case studies are presented in this 
paper, while an accompanying paper [28] follows through with the quantitative aspects of this project. The next 
section presents case studies of three multinational companies in ITPL.  
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
To provide greater understanding of Singapore’s regionalization strategy in ITPL, this section focuses on selected 
case studies of MNCs located in these parks. These case studies pave the way for a discussion on how Singapore has 
managed to develop ITPL as a centre for high value-added activities. Specifically, the interviews sought to glean 
empirical insights into how ITPL strives to establish a strategic fit between the value chain activities of the firms and 
the comparative advantages of a region. 
 
Case A - Business Process Outsourcing 
 
Company A is an American based firm undertaking e-services. It is known to provide the industry standard in 
customer support services and solutions to Global 500 companies. It was founded by an experienced management 
team with proven expertise in delivering large-scale, mission-critical customer support programs, with its corporate 
headquarters in Los Gatos, California, and operations at the ITPL, Bangalore. 
 
ITPL, with its facilities best suited for small and medium enterprises engaged largely in R&D and in the service 
industry, has become a ‘breeding ground’ for companies involved in Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). Located 
at the ‘Creator’ building of ITPL, Company A is one of many such companies. Established in the park in April 2000, 
the company has over 800 employees, occupying 60,000 square feet. 
 
Its key operations in the park include call centres, real-time customer service management and technical support to 
foreign firms. In fact, the facility in ITPL is the largest call centre in the state of Karnataka. Catering to customers as 
big as Alta Vista, the company has conducted successful programs such as outbound telemarketing, inbound phone 
customer service, inbound phone technical service, with service areas spanning countries worldwide, particularly the 
U.S. and Europe. 
 
Involved in email and telephone-based customer services targeted at customers all round the world, the company, 
like all others concerned with BPO operations, requires a facility that will provide the necessary round-the-clock 
resources. ITPL successfully makes available the same. The regular power supply, the 24-hour speedy connectivity 
and the plug-and-play services of ITPL have proven to be the distinguishing factors in luring the company. An 
added advantage is seen in the fact that the city of Bangalore abounds with excellent schools and universities6. This 
coupled with the high standard of education, serves as a continuous source of skilled employment for the call centres 
located in the park. The company sees this pool of potential employees as an added advantage in carrying out its 
operations in ITPL. 
 
Case B - Inter-Enterprise Software 
 
Company B is a wholly owned subsidiary of an international software giant. Its German parent is recognized as the 
world leader in providing collaborative business solutions for all types of industries and major markets, and enjoys 
the position of being the world’s largest inter-enterprise software company and the world’s third largest independent 
software supplier overall. The parent company also employs 28,800 people in over 50 countries. 
 
Company B was initially a German IT company, operating in the Koramangala district in the city of Bangalore. It 
was taken over by the above-mentioned parent company in 1998, a move that was accompanied by a shift into ITPL. 
With actual operations within ITPL beginning only in 1997, the company’s establishment in 1998 made it one of the 
first occupiers. It also boasts of being the park’s largest tenant, in terms of space occupancy, covering about 100,000 
square feet. 
 
The company initially had a choice of relocating itself at ITPL or at other city locations, which offered one-fourth 
the rent. However, the company chose ITPL, despite its higher rents, largely due to the following critical advantages 
that ITPL provided: uninterrupted power supply, state-of the-art infrastructure, ease and speed of setting up shop, 
and excellent communication channels.  
 
The company, after having completed four years in the park, has decided to move out.  The principal reason given 
for this is the rapid growth of the firm. In the four years since its inception it has grown from a little over 70 
employees to 500 employees today. Space constraints within the park have forced the company to look at other 
locations. ITPL has been unable to cater to the growing and irregular needs of the company, being a park suited for 
small and medium enterprises. As a fast expanding company, the company no longer views ITPL’s costly rents as 
one that can be justified. Instead, the company has moved into an expansive new campus, 15 acres in area, where it 
can enjoy economies of scale. Furthermore, the company views such a shift as an opportunity to establish its own 
identity, which it had not fully experienced in a multi-tenanted place like ITPL. However, given ITPL’s ‘distinct’ 
advantages, the company has not fully relocated. Instead it continues to retain office space in the park’s new BTS 
(Built-To-Suit) facilities. 
 
Case C - Business Process Outsourcing 
 
Company C is a wholly American owned firm, with its parent company being considered a frontrunner in 
integrating the expanding capabilities of information technology, telecommunications and the internet. The parent 
company has its headquarters in Virginia, U.S.A. Its services include voice-based services, internet services, back-
office functions, and interactive teleservices.  
 
Company C, located in ITPL, was incorporated in May 1999 as a 100% subsidiary. Its facility within the park 
spreads over 42,000 square feet and employs 12,000 employees. The company’s functions within the park largely 
focus on Business Process Outsourcing, which include both inbound and outbound customer care. 
 
As in the case of other companies in the same industry, Company C, too, cites the permanent power supply, 24-hour 
connectivity and supporting infrastructure as the vital factors that prompted it to situate in the park. The company 
also employs a sizeable portion of the IT graduates that Bangalore churns out every year. 
 
In addition to the above, according to a company official, the firm perceives ITPL’s excellent and professional 
support services and maintenance programs as a huge advantage that gives it an added edge over its peers that are 
located elsewhere. Such benefits have been the direct result of the Singaporean-styled management. However, the 
company has expressed reservation over the numerous other call centres making their way into ITPL to make use of 
the same advantages, which escalates into other problems such as heightened competition, further sharing of 
resources and the “pool of entry level people getting smaller”. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The tenants at ITPL pose a stark contrast to those in the other Singapore-styled industrial parks in Indonesia, 
Vietnam and China, which have managed to attract a significant majority of their tenants on the basis of abundant 
low-cost, low-skilled labour. The scenario in ITPL is decidedly different. Our study suggests that the same 
advantage of plentiful and cost-effective labour has not been the sole influencing factor in attracting firms to the 
park. The primary reason, which has encouraged firms to settle in the park, has been that of excellent infrastructural 
facilities and the Singapore-styled management characterized by its quintessential efficiency. Anecdotal evidence 
from our on-site interviews suggests that international IT firms, such as Companies A, B and C, have relocated to 
ITPL from other locations for this reason. This, along with the advanced technology made available at ITPL, has 
helped make the park the cynosure of all companies engaged chiefly in the non-manufacturing industries, that is, 
those placed in the higher end of the value chain.  
 
Theories, from the perspective of the firm, have argued that not only should the production process be viewed as a 
value chain [9] [18], but also, firms should identify comparative or location-specific advantages unique to each 
country/territory [5], which will serve to complement the competitive advantage they enjoy as a result of being 
placed higher up in the value chain. Additionally, in the face of globalisation, the location-specific advantages need 
to be altered to suit the increasing spatial integration of complex and rapidly changing economic activities and to 
also consider the role of national and regional authorities in their influence over the extent and structure of localised 
centres of excellence [6]. Thus, a holistic approach must be adopted that takes into consideration firm-oriented 
competitive advantages as well as comparative advantages offered by regions. Synergistic efforts will occur when 
there exists a strategic fit between the competitive and comparative advantages. 
 
ITPL represents a modified version of the Porter-Kogut analytical framework, whereupon the park has witnessed the 
location of firms engaged in marketing and sales, and other services (viz, the primary activities), which were 
supported by other activities such as technological development and infrastructure within the park (viz, the 
secondary activities), sufficiently provided by the Singapore partner. A case in point is the rapid establishment of 
companies in the BPO industry, and the myriad of e-services, including telemarketing and customer sales services, 
by simply making utmost use of the telecommunication facilities that the park showcased, as substantiated by our 
case studies. Indeed, technological development has constantly taken place within the park, to accommodate entry of 
new firms, and expansion of existing ones. ITPL’s management and the governmental support it has garnered have 
proven to be the park’s unique selling proposition. As well, ITPL is well-endowed with location-specific 
advantages: a blend of technology and infrastructure on one hand, and competitive skilled labour on the other, to 
support high value-added processes.  
 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
Set against this scenario, while ITPL succeeds in providing the crucial links within the value chain that give client 
firms a competitive advantage, the problem arises on the flip side of the desired strategic fit – the host country’s 
ability to provide comparative advantages. In this aspect, India has succeeded only in making available the 
advantages of ‘factors of production’. While ITPL does provide some components of comparative advantage which 
the host country does not, this is not complemented by the infrastructure outside the park, where roads to supporting 
administration continue to be nearly non-existent. In fact, the excellent infrastructure within the park that the tenants 
extol is not the result of an Indian endeavour. Both economic and political advantages, which Singapore sought to 
make best use of, were initially present. The Indian and the Karnataka government aligned their objectives with 
those of its Singapore counterpart while establishing the park. However, as it happens with most government-run 
projects, the state government has not made further inroads into the project with its support; instead, much was left 
in the hands of the private sector and the Singapore consortium. The state government has reduced its stake in the 
project to a mere 6 per cent. 
 
Heightened competition 
 
With the sprouting of numerous similar parks in the same vicinity which are able to compete aggressively on cost, 
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are increasingly losing their allure. For ITPL, its success apparently hinges on 
the ‘Singapore-styled design and management’ reputation, and its capacity to provide stable electricity is the only 
differentiating factor from the other IT parks like the Software Tech Park and Electronics City. The premium placed 
on ITPL’s formulaic ‘one-stop’ service and self-sufficient infrastructure is, however, called into question. The listed 
lease price is Rs50 (approximately US$1) per square foot, whereas the rate in other areas, and within Electronic City 
itself, just outside ITPL, is less than Rs15. Our on-site interviews with IPTL tenants alluded to the possibility that 
the park’s attractiveness may, in time, be eroded, as more IT parks and companies are established within the vicinity 
to capitalize on the area’s repute, while offering lower rentals with reliable energy, as the state develops. 
 
Political ‘Patronage’   
Reliance on political patronage (and personal ties) rather than transparent contracts has had advantages and 
disadvantages. In India, varying degrees of commitment and support by different state governments towards the 
country’s development can affect ITPL’s competitive advantage. The lack of good supporting infrastructure in the 
surrounding environment, and the disparity in local state-government supporting different cities, serve as a deterrent 
to investors, even as cities like Hyderabad, Mumbai and Chennai continue to advance technologically. On a broader 
front, corruption remains endemic, and bureaucratic red-tapism is difficult to circumvent. These considerations are, 
by themselves, deterrences to potential investors, even with Singapore’s presence and involvement.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The practical significance here is that Singapore’s overseas parks tend to exist as investment enclaves within a 
disjointed economic and policy environment. They are linked to transnational investment networks, business elites 
and specific government commitments. The positive aspect of this is that the parks can be sites of investment 
privilege, in respect of their regulatory controls, infrastructure quality and status with public and private agencies. 
The weakness is that the privileges obtained are vulnerable to changes in political allegiance and the infrastructure 
efficiency is at risk from the uncontrolled broader environment in which the park is located. This study has shown 
that the initial optimism with which the regionalization initiative was unveiled has not been justified, that 
development assumptions have proven to be misplaced, and that Singapore’s ‘vision’ - to create an environment for 
enterprise – has not been fully realized. The power of ideas, without cognizance of socio-political realities, has its 
limits. 
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1This paper and three accompanying studies are funded by the Wharton-SMU Research Centre, Singapore 
Management University. 
 
2A summary of the regionalization incentive schemes may be gleaned from the Singapore Investment News, 
Regionalization Supplement, May 1993 [24]. 
 
3
 For a scholarly discussion on the political economy of Singapore’s development strategy, see [2] [8] [13] [20] [22]. 
There is also an extensive political-economy literature on Singapore’s regionalization program, succinctly 
summarized in [30]. The principles of government involvement are rationalized in the 1993 Report of the 
Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas. 
 
4The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practice preferred by the linked communities of 
‘overseas Chinese’ [3] [11] [19], the ‘bamboo network’ which Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in 
Indonesia [7] [23] and China [4] [29]. Personal ties between Chairman, SEDB, and Ratan Tata (of the Tata Group) 
reportedly facilitated the move into India [1]. 
5
 The Singapore consortium, Information Technology Park Investments Pte Ltd,  includes RSP Architects, Planners 
and Engineers, L&M Properties, Sembawang Industrial, Technology Parks (a Jurong Town Corporation subsidiary) 
and Parameswara Holdings (the investment arm of the Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce). 
6
 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software engineers every year, and Bangalore has 
been a ‘hunting ground’ for Singapore companies and Singapore-based multinationals seeking low-cost IT 
specialists. 
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